Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1970

First Amendment "Due Process"
Henry Paul Monaghan
Columbia Law School, monaghan@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the First Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/797

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

FIRST AMENDMENT "DUE PROCESS"
Henry P. Monaghan *
A number of recent Supreme Court opinions, primarily in the

obscenity area, have fastened strict procedural requirements on governmentalaction aimed at controlling the exercise of first amendment

rights. Professor Monaghan believes that there are two basic principles that can be distilled from these cases: that a judicial body, fol-

lowing an adversaryhearing, must decide on the protected character
of the speech, and that the judicial determination must either pre-

cede or immediately follow any governmental action which restricts
speech. The author argues that these two broad principles should
limit any governmental activity which affects freedom of speech, no
matter how indirectly. In conclusion, he suggests that courts must
afford affirmative remedies in order to give full protection to first
amendment interests.

P11HE history of American freedom," Mr. Justice Frank. furter once observed, "is, in no small measure, the history of procedure." I While this comment was made in the context
of criminal procedure, courts have lately come to realize that
procedural guarantees play an equally large role in protecting
freedom of speech; indeed, they "assume an importance fully as
great as the validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied." 2 Responding to this realization, courts have begun to
construct a body of procedural law which defines the manner in
which they and other bodies must evaluate and resolve first
amendment claims- a first amendment "due process," if you
will.
It is in the obscenity area that the courts have been most
concerned with procedural matters. There the Supreme Court
has fashioned a series of specific rules designed to prevent insensitive procedural devices from strangling first amendment interests. The Court has found itself developing a comprehensive
system of "procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers
of a censorship system." 3 In so doing, the Court has placed
little reliance upon the due process requirements of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, but instead has turned directly to the
first amendment as the source of the rules. Thus, rather than attempting to apply the traditional requirements of due process to
* Professor of Law, Boston University. B.A., University of Massachusetts, 1955;
LL.B., Yale, i958; LL.M., Harvard, i96o.
I Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (separate opinion). See also
In re Gault, 387 U.S. i, 19-2, (1967).
2
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958).
'Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965).
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obscenity determinations, the Court has judged the adequacy of
procedures by a different standard: does the procedure show
"the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression?" '
While the Court has nowhere been so explicit as in the obscenity area, it has begun to extend first amendment due process
beyond obscenity cases. It has, for example, sharply circumscribed the power of state courts to enjoin arguably protected
mass demonstrations, 5 has shown an increasing reluctance to restrict the availability of prospective relief in first amendment
cases,0 and has even held that the burden of proof rules in tax
litigation are of constitutional magnitude when first amendment
interests are at stake. 7 The extension beyond obscenity is entirely warranted. If the Constitution requires elaborate procedural safeguards in the obscenity area, a fortiori it should require
equivalent procedural protection when the speech involved - for
example, political speech- implicates more central first amendment concerns. Like the substantive rules themselves, insensitive
procedures can "chill" the right of free expression. Accordingly,
wherever first amendment claims are involved, sensitive procedural devices are necessary
to insure that the Court is called upon to balance competing
interests of state and citizen only when the judgment that conduct should be punished has been made in a setting which is
designed to discriminate between protected and unprotected
activity.8
4d.
'E.g., Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (x968),
discussed at pp. 536-37 infra.

I E.g., Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
'In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), the Court struck down an otherwise adequate tax assessment procedure because the state was attempting to regulate speech via tax liability. While the case was ostensibly a due process decision,
the gravamen of the Court's objection to the procedure was that it suppressed free
speech without any compelling state interest. This case made it clear that criminal
sanctions do not have to be invoked before freedom of speech is affected. See
generally Note, Civil Disabilities and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 842

(x969). A threat of expulsion from college or of loss of employment can easily
deter one from speaking his mind; likewise publicity which accompanies legislative
disclosure of the membership of unpopular groups may subject present members to
harassment and deter new members from joining. See Bates v. Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 523-24 (196o).

In two cases concerning government employment and

the Communist party, the Court has indicated that procedural defects in the system
of regulation were among factors which caused the Court to declare the systems
unconstitutional. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (I967) (federal Subversive Activities Control Act); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. II, 17 (1966)
(Arizona loyalty oath).
8
Friedman, Mr. Justice Brennan: The First Decade, 80 HAav. L. REv. 7, 22
(I966).
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The government, in other words, may regulate certain types of
activity, but it must make sure, via proper procedural safeguards,
that protected speech is not the loser.'
I.

THE REQUIREMENT OF A JUDICIAL DETERMINATION

OF THE CHARACTER OF SPEECH

A. Obscenity
Central to first amendment due process is the notion that a
judicial, rather than an administrative, determination of the character of the speech is necessary. Cases in the obscenity area first
established the principle, but neither their reasoning nor their
language implies that the principle is restricted to obscenity determinations. Manual Enterprises v. Day 10 contains the first
clear suggestion that, by virtue of the first amendment itself,
courts alone are competent to decide whether speech is constitutionally protected. In that case, the Post Office Department had
excluded as "non-mailable" certain allegedly obscene magazines."
The case reached the Supreme Court after an evidentiary hearing before a "judicial officer" of the Post Office, an appeal to an
administrative board within the Post Office, and litigation in the
lower federal courts. In a six-to-one decision, the Court set aside
the post office's action. There was, however, no opinion of the
Court. Mr. Justice Harlan announced judgment and, joined by
Mr. Justice Stewart, said that the materials at issue were not
patently offensive and therefore not obscene. In an elaborate
concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan, three Justices concluded that the Post Office lacked statutory authority to exclude
the materials. A contrary conclusion, they said, would raise inter
alia the substantial constitutional question "whether Congress, if
it can authorize exclusion of mail, can provide that obscenity be
determined in the first instance in any forum except a court," 12
without violating the first amendment. 13 The concurring opinion
'See Marcus v. A Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 730-31 (i96i).
10370 U.S. 478 (1962).

" The action was taken by the Post Office Department under the provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964), which "declared [obscene materials] to be nonmailable
matter [which] shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post
office or by any letter carrier."
For a collection of cases dealing with the power of the Post Office Department
to bar obscene materials from the mail, see Annot., 76 L. Ed. 845 (1932); Annot.,
8 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (1963). For an earlier discussion of this subject see Paul &

Schwartz, Obscenity in the Mails: A Comment on Some Problems of Federal
Censorship, io6 U. PA. L. REv. 214 (1957).
11 370 U.S. at 497-98.
" Mr. Justice Brennan's suggestion that the first amendment itself demanded a
judicial determination of whether speech was protected avoided the problems that
have plagued earlier judicial efforts to establish a doctrine that certain issues could

1970]

FIRST AMENDMENT "DUE PROCESS"

did no more than pose this question and express the "gravest
doubts" that such a procedure would be constitutionally permissible.14
The seeds planted by Mr. Justice Brennan began to bear fruit
in Bantam Books v. Sullivan,1 5 a case challenging the activities
not be withdrawn from independent judicial judgment because of the due process
clause and/or article III considerations (and/or the constitutional provisions governing the jury trial). The general problem is one of ancient standing, see Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1856),
but it reached its judicial zenith in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). There,
Chief Justice Hughes recognized that the Constitution permitted a broad range of
factual determinations to be made by administrative agencies, even in suits between
private parties for money damages. L. JAFFE, JuDIciAL CONTROL or ADMNSTRATIVE
ACTIoN 89-9o (1965) [hereafter cited as JAFFE]. But he relied on the article
III grant of "judicial power" to hold that de novo, independent judicial review
must exist with respect to "facts" previously found by an administrative agency
which are "constitutional" or "jurisdictional" in nature, i.e., their existence is a condition precedent to congressional power. 285 U.S. at 54-64. A dissenting opinion
by Justice Brandeis argued that-article III could not support a distinction between
"constitutional" and other factual determinations. Id. at 80-93. But, like Hughes,
Brandeis seemed to assume that there are occasions in which judicial factfinding
is required because "under certain circumstances the constitutional requirement of
due process is a requirement of judicial process." Id. at 87 (dissenting opinion).
Moreover, both Hughes (in Crowell, 285 U.S. at 49-5o) and Brandeis (concurring
in St. Joseph's Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936)) seemed to
assume that article III required an independent determination by a court of all
"law" questions, an assumption, however, which is inconsistent with numerous
decisions. See JArFE 546, 556-64.

The complexities involved in developing any of the various positions articulated
in Crowell and its progeny are considerable. It is, therefore, unclear whether
Crowell supports broad review of "fact" questions, "law" questions, or "mixed"
questions of law and fact (i.e., "law application") as most questions in the free
speech area generally are. Additional difficulties are raised because, unlike due
process, see Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289 (1920),

article III cannot be used to justify independent judicial scrutiny by state courts
over state administrative action. The foregoing questions are examined with great
incisiveness by Professor Hart in The Power of Congress to Limit The Jurisdiction
of The Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialetic, 66 HARv. L. Rzv. 1362 (1953).
See also JAFFE 546-653; 4 K. DAvs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 29.08-.Io (1958).

In view of the uncertainty that surrounds the Crowell doctrines, Mr. Justice
Brennan wisely avoided any reliance upon this line of authority. Moreover, the first
amendment basis for the position of Mr. Justice Brennan means that procedural
rules growing out of the doctrine will be directly responsive to the first amendment
interests which the rule is designed to protect. It is, however, interesting to note
that in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 19o n.6 (1964), Mr. Justice Brennan referred to Crowell as supporting broad appellate review.
14370 U.S. at 518-x9. In dissent, Mr. Justice Clark apparently disagreed, id.
at 523-24, although he purported to reserve judgment on the point. Id. at 521 n.2.

Mr. Justice Harlan intimated that prior decisions of the Court would permit such
a procedure, but refused to consider the matter further without "full-dress argument and briefing." Id. at 480 n.2.
IZ372 U.S. 58 (1963). In this case, the Court declared that the informal pres-

sure that a state obscene literature commission put on distributors was an uncon-
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of a state obscene literature commission. In essence, the commission exerted considerable informal pressure on local retailers to
withdraw objectionable literature from their newsstands. The
commission's activities ranged from vigorous "advice" to the local
retailers to threats of criminal prosecution. The Court held that
the commission's conduct amounted to an unconstitutional prior
restraint. In condemning this procedure, the Court referred to
two particular deficiencies: there was no provision for "judicial
superintendence" of the commission's actions, and there was no
assurance of immediate judicial determination of the validity
of any administratively imposed restraint. The net result was,
therefore, that an administrative agency rather than a court was
imposing a final restraint on speech. Bantam Books strongly
intimated that the first amendment forbids this.
Freedman v. Maryland 16 was a short step from what had
gone before. A Maryland motion picture censorship statute required an exhibitor to submit the film to an administrative board
prior to its showing. If the board disapproved the film, the burden of instituting judicial review lay with the exhibitor. The
statute put no time limits on either the administrative or the
judicial determinations. Accepting the argument that under the
statute "judicial review may be too little and too late," 17 a
unanimous Court invalidated the statute in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Brennan. While unwilling to hold that a motion picture
exhibitor had an absolute right to exhibit without a prior determination of obscenity, the Court ringed any such procedure with
tight safeguards. Most important here was the Court's statement
that
[t]he teaching of our cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring a
judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. 18
Freedman's preference for judicial evaluation of first amendment claims rests upon the most fundamental considerations the inherent institutional differences between courts and administrative agencies, no matter how judicial the administrative proceedings may be. First, long judicial tenure frees judges, in most
cases, from direct political pressures. Judicial insulation encourstitutional prior restraint. In State Cinema, Inc. v. Ryan, 303 F. Supp. 579 (D.
Mass. 1969), Judge Wyzanski held that Bantam Books was inapplicable unless
public rather than private threats are made by local officials.
16380

U.S. 51 (1965); accord, Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusak, 390 U.S. 139 (1968)

(per curiam) (holding invalid on its face a Chicago ordinance which did not provide for a speedy judicial determination of whether a film was protected).
17380 U.S. at 57.
8

' Id. at 58.
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ages impartial decisionmaking; more importantly, it permits the
courts to take the "long view" of issues. Administrative bodies,
particularly at a state level, are rarely so insulated; indeed,
they are often seen primarily as political organs. Second, the
role of the administrator is not that of the impartial adjudicator but that of the expert - a role which necessarily gives an
administrative agency a narrow and restricted viewpoint. This
is particularly pernicious in the obscenity area; those constantly
exposed to the perverse and the abberational in literature are
quick to find obscenity in all they see. 9 But institutional "tunnel
vision" is by no means restricted to the censors; a labor board,
for example, when dealing with questions of speech, is more likely to see the problem in terms of labor-management relations
than in terms of first amendment interests. Courts, on the other
hand, do not suffer congenitally from this myopia; their general
jurisdiction gives them a broad perspective which no agency can
have. They deal daily with a wide variety of situations, and this
fact goes far toward eliminating the deficiencies that come from
excessive singlemindedness.
The institutional characteristics of the American judicial system are, therefore, of central importance in realizing the constitutional guarantees..2 ' The broad range of matters within the
jurisdiction of the courts, coupled with the life tenure and the
relative insulation of the judges, means, as Professor Hart observed, that the "structure of American institutions" predestined
courts "to be a voice of reason, charged with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal and durable principles . . 21 Professor Bickel adds:
Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the
insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends
of government. This is crucial in sorting out the enduring values
"9One may well question what type of person will put himself forward as a
judge of morality. See text and sources cited in Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648, 658 & n.34. It has been observed, in
the broader context, of general censorship, that
[i]f he be of such worth as behooves him, there cannot be a more tedious
and unpleasing journey-work, a greater loss of time levied upon his head,
than to be made the perpetual reader of unchosen books and pamphlets
.... we may easily foresee what kind of licensers we are to expect hereafter, either ignorant, imperious, and remiss, or basely pecuniary.
J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 20-21 (Everyman ed. 1927).
20

[T]he constitutional courts of this country are the acknowledged architects
and guarantors of the integrity of the legal system. I use integrity here in
its specific sense of unity and coherence and in its more general sense of the
effectuation of the values upon which this unity and coherence are built.
JAFFE, supra note 13, at 589-90.
21 Hart, The Supreme Court, r958 Term-Foreword, The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73

HARV.

L. REv. 84, 99 (959).
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of a society, and it is not something that institutions can do well
occasionally,22while operating for the most part with a different
set of gears.

These considerations are of paramount importance when first
amendment interests are at stake. Courts alone are institutionally able consistently to discern, and to apply, the values embodied in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.2 3
B. Implications for Other Areas of Substantive Law
Nothing in the rationale of Freedman and its predecessors
suggests that their principles are confined to the obscenity area.
In fact, when the subject matter of speech is political in character rather than bordering on the obscene, the need for a disinterested judicial judgment is even greater. One can, then, hypothesize as a general principle of first amendment due process that
no procedure is valid which leaves the protected character of
22 A. BICxEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 25-26 (1962).
23 In emphasizing the institutional importance of the courts in protecting first

amendment interests, Freedman and its predecessors are not without some difficulty.
To interpret the first amendment so as to require an evidentiary hearing before
speech can finally be restrained is one thing; but to say that this evidentiary hearing must involve a court is quite another. On the surface at least, such a rule contradicts the principle that separation of powers is not a requirement imposed on
the states by virtue of the federal constitution. See Dreyer v. Illinois, x87 U.S. 71,
84 (1902). In fact, however, the traditional rule has been too broadly formulated.
To be sure, separation of legislative from executive power on the state level seems
to have little federal constitutional significance. But several provisions of the
original federal constitution (e.g., the constitutional prohibition against bills of
attainder) seem to presuppose the existence of a separate state judicial system.
But see United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 472-73 (x965) (White, J., dissenting); The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 105, 121 (1965). And the
expansive modern reading of the fourteenth amendment seriously erodes any purported rule that no separation of powers is required on the state level, at least so
far as the existence of a separate state judicial system is concerned. Thus, "incorporation" of the fourth amendment, with its requirement of a magistrate's
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, presupposes the
existence of an independent state judicial system. See, e.g., State ex rel. White v.
Simpson, 28 Wis. 2d 590, 597-99, 137 N.W.2d 392, 394-95 (z965) (executive warrants invalid); cf. Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 370-71 (i968). But cf.
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 230 (i96o). More importantly, the succession
of cases which have imposed the requirements of the sixth amendment (e.g., speedy
trial, counsel, and compulsory process) and which culminated in the holding in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), that a state is not free to deny a jury
trial in any serious criminal case, all plainly assume the existence of a state judicial
system. The impact of these decisions is, however, far more theoretical than practical, since as a matter of its own governmental structure each state possesses a
separate judicial system. Accordingly, the imposition of a first amendment requirement that final determination of the protected character of speech must be made
by a court will result in only the most minor dislocation in the state remedial
system.
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speech to the final determination of an administrative agency, no
matter how "judicial" its procedure. This principle not only has
a direct bearing on matters generally characterized by the label
of "prior restraint," such as laws conditioning the exercise of first
amendment rights on the issuing of a permit,24 but it also extends
to matters affecting the internal operations of governmental institutions. For example, under Freedman it would seem plainly
improper to discharge government employees or expel state university students where first amendment interests are involved
unless provision is made for a timely judicial determination of
the first amendment claims. Indeed, where free speech interests
are involved, it is even doubtful that Congress could reclaim its
ancient power to punish contempt without judicial review. 5
Freedman would also seem to require some reconsideration of
the employer free speech cases. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 6
decided at the end of last Term, the Court once again affirmed
that, under the first amendment, an employer may indicate what
he believes to be the consequences of unionization, but he has
no constitutional right to make threats of economic reprisal. In
rejecting an argument that this line was unconstitutionally vague,
the Court made the somewhat unresponsive remark that "a reviewing court must recognize the Board's competence in the first
instance to judge the impact [of the speech] in the context of
the employer-employee relationship." 27 To be sure, the Court
did not purport to make the administrative determination conclusive. 2 But the precise import of its language is uncertain; it
does not define the scope of judicial review over an administrative finding that the speech was "coercive." Freedman seems to
forbid application of the substantial evidence rule to such a finding; it requires the reviewing court to make an independent
judgment on the first amendment question. 9
24 See
21

pp. 53 2-43 infra.
Congress has an implied power to imprison, for the session of Congress, non-

members who refuse to respond to its summons and give testimony. Anderson v.
Dunn, ig U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). Since 1857, however, the general procedure
of the Congress has been to prosecute recalcitrant witnesses for misdemeanors under
2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (1964).
This may be the only constitutionally permissible
procedure for the Congress to follow after Freedman. It is clear that Congress is
bound by the first amendment, see, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,
196-97 (1957), and it is only considerations of separation of power that might
restrain a court from putting this limitation on the contempt power. Recently,
however, the Court has shown an increased willingness to probe the internal affairs
of Congress. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
26395 U.S. 575 (I969).
27 Id.at 620.
2
2

1d. at 6x9.

1 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit long ago articulated the proper

approach when it said that "the problem of balancing the right of free speech by
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In applying Freedman to administrative determinations, however, one must recognize an important distinction. Freedman requires only that the court make a separate, independent judgment
on the administrative record; it would push Freedman too far to
require additionally that the court construct its own record. So
far as the first amendment is concerned, the task of historical
factfinding may be left to administrative agencies, 30 at least if,
as in Gissel, the agencies' procedures appear reasonably capable
of ensuring reliable findings. At a minimum, this would require
an evidentiary proceeding, with the protections of counsel, confrontation and cross-examination. Moreover, even if these safeguards are present, a completely de novo proceeding would seem
required unless there is a transcript or written summary of the
administrative proceedings; without such an administrative record, a court cannot confidently determine either the dimensions
of the first amendment claim or the exact posture in which it was
evaluated. Of course, measured by these standards few administrative determinations, particularly those at the state and local
level, will avoid a first amendment requirement of de novo judicial factfinding. For example, where students are expelled from
state universities over their objection that the expulsion resulted
from the exercise of the right of free speech, a court must either
compel the university to follow an adequate administrative procedure 31 or must undertake the task of constructing its own
record.
C. The First Amendment and the Jury
The constitutional requirement of "sensitive tools" 32 for the
evaluation of first amendment claims is not satisfied simply by
an employer against the employee's right to the free use of the same in matters of
self-organization is essentially a judicial equation which we have the duty to resolve for ourselves." NLRB v. Continental Oil Co., 159 F.2d 326, 329 (loth Cir.
1947).
30 JAFrE, supra note 13, at 652-53. It is, however, possible that a statute may
require more extensive judicial factfinding than would the first amendment itself.
See Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, X091 (8th Cir. 2969)
(Lay, J., dissenting).
31 The requirements of an adequate procedure in expulsion hearings here suggested are more rigorous than courts have been inclined to apply. See, e.g., Wright
v. Texas Southern University, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. x968); Madera v. Board of
Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968) (suspension,
not expulsion); Dixon v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. x961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (2962). The courts, however, have analyzed the cases in
due process terms, and have not given consideration to the possible impact on the
first amendment. See Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077,
ro89 (8th Cir. 1969); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 122, 117-18 (D. Mass. 2969).
32 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
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use of the judicial system. In the Court's view, the Constitution

requires a procedure which is "designed to focus searchingly
on the question of [the protected character of speech] ." 3 To
achieve this end, the doctrine of Freedman necessarily involves
an important corollary, namely, a reconsideration of the role of
the jury in first amendment cases. Since Duncan v. Louisiana34
and its progeny now establish that a criminal defendant has a
right to trial by jury for all serious criminal offenses, the question is whether, in cases not within the compass of Duncan, the
first amendment requires the existence of a jury for certain types
of determinations. An affirmative response would, of course,
represent a significant departure from established doctrine. Nonetheless, in Kingsley Books v. Brown,35 a dissenting opinion by
Mr. Justice Brennan condemned the state injunction proceeding
on the ground that the absence of a jury was a "fatal defect."
Justice Brennan apparently believed that, as the embodiment of
community norms, a jury must determine whether materials appeal to "prurient interests" and are "patently offensive." The
dissent, however, fails to articulate any comprehensive conception of the role of the jury in the first amendment. Moreover,
in Freedman v. Maryland,3 6 Mr. Justice Brennan seems to have
abandoned his position because in Freedman he sanctions an administrative-judicial process without jury participation.
In general, any expansive conception of the jury's role is inconsistent with a vigorous application of the first amendment.
Like administrative agencies, the jury cannot be expected to be
sufficiently sensitive to the first amendment interests involved in
any given proceeding. The political libel cases squarely raise the
3
problem of jury insensitivity. In the New York Times case 1
three concurring Justices argued that the Court's rule that public
officials could sue for defamation if false statements were made
with "malice" was insufficient to protect first amendment freedoms because a jury was likely to find malice if the views expressed were unpopular ones.3 Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion
for the Court never adequately met this point. Perhaps, as he
later argued, malicious untruth like obscenity lacks redeeming
3

Marcus v. A Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).

34391 U.S. 145 (1968).
35 354 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1957).

3638o U.S. 5I (I965).
31 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Moreover, much of the
Court's work in administering the Times rule seems devoted to confining the jury's
latitude to infer malice. See, e.g., Beckley Newspaper Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81,
84-85 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 79-83 (1966); cf. St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
38 Id. at 295 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring); id. at 300 (Goldberg and
Douglas, JJ., concurring).
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social value,39 but the critical questions are how the defendant's
mens rea is to be established, and whether, because of potential
prejudices, a jury determination threatens substantial inroads
upon first amendment interests. This may be a situation where it
is necessary to "overprotect" free speech interests in order, as
Professor Kalven puts it, "to assure that [they are] not underprotected." 40 Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in the Times case
itself gives substance to these concerns. After announcing the
rule, the opinion elaborately reviewed the evidence and held that,
on remand, it would be insufficient as a matter of law to support
a finding of malice. Thus, in the very case in which the rule was
laid down, the Court was unwilling to let the jury apply it.4
The jury has, it is true, long been extolled as a great guarantor of individual freedom, including freedom of speech. 2 English
history and our own colonial past contain notable illustrations of
the jury's refusal to return convictions based upon criticism of
government. But one should recall that the famous free speech
cases of the past were really part of a much larger conflict between a fairly homogeneous citizenry and an unrepresentative
government. In earlier times, therefore, freedom of speech was
conceived primarily as a guarantee that the voice of the people
-

the majority -

would be heard, that unrepresentative govern-

ment would be forced to hear, if not heed, their rising voices. As
a bearer of majority sentiments, the jury served as a powerful
and effective vehicle for preventing governmental repression of
majority views. 43 The law of seditious libel found rough sledding
in the hands of English and colonial juries. It is, however, important to recognize that the juries were extolled because they
were acting in a lawless fashion. They may have helped to
create new laws, but as the famous trial of John Peter Zenger
illustrates, 44 they plainly refused to abide by the laws they were
charged with administering. And when public sentiment ran
"See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964); Brennan, The Supreme
Court and The Meiklejohn Interpretation of The First Amendment, 79 HARV. L.
REv. I, x8-ig (x965).
oKalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. Cr. REv. 191, 213.
41 376 U.S. at 284-88. See also Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public
Official, 8o HARV. L. REV. 1730, 1750 (1967).
"The classic, although now outdated, history of freedom of speech in the
United States is Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNInED STATES (941), in which
Professor Chafee, anticipating the Times case, argues that the framers intended to
abolish the law of seditious libel. Id. at 16-22. This view is sharply challenged
in L. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS In EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY
oF SuPPREssIoN (x963).
4" See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 42, at 131-32.
"' THE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER (V. Buranelli ed. 1957).
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strongly in favor of the government, juries could readily become
ex post facto censors of the press in libel cases. 5
To the extent that the law of seditious libel was a bulwark
of unrepresentative government, it was long dead before it was
formally interred in the New York Times case. The government
had ceased to be grossly unrepresentative, once English government was thrown off and popular suffrage extended. As a
protection for the majority against the government the first
amendment has thus ceased to be of major importance. Much
of its present importance lies in protecting unpopular speech, that
of Jehovah's Witnesses, Communists, fascists, radicals and the
like. 6 This development is a matter of fundamental significance,
and one which requires a reevaluation of the assumption that the
jury is a reliable factfinder in free speech cases. The jury may
be an adequate reflector of the community's conscience, but that
conscience is not and never has been very tolerant of dissent.
In the federal court system the jury will unquestionably continue to play a significant role in historical factfinding by virtue
of article III and the sixth and seventh amendments, but despite
41
the Court's expansive solicitude for the jury in other contexts,
first amendment considerations should be read to confine, not expand, the jury's role. This confinement follows from the perhaps
unprovable premise that, by virtue of their training and occupation, judges are less inclined to be affected by passion and
prejudice and more inclined to realize the importance of first
amendment values. Moreover, action taken by lower court judges
is more readily reviewable than action taken by the jury.
Methods for limiting the role of the jury are numerous. They
range from rules which narrow jury discretion to ones which
completely exclude the jury. The burden of proof rule of Speiser
" In the years of 1792-94, when revolution on the Continent made many
Englishmen uneasy, juries were quick to convict of seditious libel and harsh in
their approach to the Libel Act of X792. See 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORy OF THE
CIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 358-68 (1883).
46 The express articulation of these goals has, however, been of very recent
origin. The first amendment is today generally understood to protect and encourage criticism of government policy, "[flor speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.' Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). This protection makes possible "the distinctive
contribution of a minority group to the ideas and beliefs of our society." NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963). For the view that the Court's "role" in our

constitutional scheme is to protect "under-represented" minority groups through a
vigorous application of the first amendment, see M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 34-39 (1966). See generally, Brennan,
supra note 39, at 14-18. But the intention of the framers of the Constitution on
the 47
scope of the first amendment is by no means clear. See note 42 supra.
See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 5oo (1959).

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83: 518

v. Randall48 could be seen as an example of the former. So too
are special findings when they are used. Professor Freund has
suggested that in view of the sweep of the privilege to defame
that exists under the Times case, a public official might require
the jury to return a special finding so that it will appear of record
that the statements were untrue even if they were constitutionally privileged.4" Professor Freund viewed the special finding as
a device to protect the reputation of the public official. But special findings might also be used to minimize possible jury confusion or prejudice. Requiring the jury to focus on specific
issues increases the chances that the jury will rationally and carefully consider first amendment interests. Obscenity cases, for
example, involve several discrete issues, and the jury - at least
in civil trials " - could be required to focus on each separately.
Of perhaps even greater importance are rules which wholly
eliminate any role for the jury. Fear that a jury is not likely to
administer a rule properly might impel a court to choose a prophylactic -

albeit theoretically less desirable -

rule to minimize

the jury's role. For example, evidence that juries are readily
inferring malice from the expression of unpopular views might
cause the Court to change the Times rule and give an absolute
immunity to criticism of public officials.
Moreover, even where a jury has an unquestionable role to
play, as in a criminal prosecution for selling allegedly obscene
materials, first amendment considerations might alter the normal
distribution of functions between judge and jury. For example,
obscenity prosecutions present a series of discrete inquiries:
whether the materials (a) appeal to "prurient interests"; (b) are
"patently offensive"; (c) are "utterly without redeeming social
48357 U.S. 513 (1958), discussed in note 7 supra.

oFreund, Constitutional Dilemmas, 45 B.U.L. REv. 13, 18 (1965).
In federal criminal trials, use of special questions or findings seems verboten.
In a recent case, United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d I65 (ist Cir. 1969), the First Circuit reversed the convictions of two of the four defendants because the judge on his
own motion had submitted special questions to the jury. The court believed that
the practice tended unduly to influence the jury's deliberations because the structure
of the questions might lead the jury to speculate about the judge's view. Whether
this reasoning is sound is open to question. It is, for example, not clear that in terms
of their impact special questions can meaningfully be distinguished from jury instructions. In each case the relevant inquiry would seem to be whether the particular charge or question had a reasonable likelihood of intruding the judge's
supposed views into the jury room. Perhaps the case can be better seen as a
reaffirmation of the venerable tradition in Anglo-American law that the deliberations of the criminal jury shall be immune from external scrutiny. See Bushell's
Case, 124 Eng. Rep. ioo6 (C.P. x670); The King v. Shipley, 99 Eng. Rep. 774
(K.B. 1784). In any case, Spock would seem to have no application to noncriminal
cases, where special findings are available as a matter of course. FED. R. Civ. P. 49.
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value"; and (d) whether there is any evidence of pandering.5 '
Judges have recognized that they must make an independent
judgment on the question whether materials have redeeming social value.5" Although the Court has never been explicit about
the reason for this requirement,5 3 the first amendment would seem
to provide an adequate basis for it. Judges ought to be required
to find, before submitting the issue to the jury, that the speech
or material is not protected by the first amendment; the jury
would of course be precluded from acting if the judge finds the

material protected.
The critical question, however, is whether the judge, if he

finds that the speech is unprotected, must submit the issue to the
jury. Dennis v. United States 54 indicates that the defendant has

no constitutional right to insist that the jury pass on the protected character of the speech. There a divided Court held that
the trial judge had not erred in refusing to submit to the jury
the issue of whether speech constituted a "clear and present
danger." But whatever the extent of constitutional compulsion,
surely no error is committed if the trial judge does permit the
jury to consider whether the speech is protected -so
long as
the judge himself has made a determination that it is not. This
5
is analogous to the procedure required by Jackson v. Denno,"
which permitted the judge in a criminal proceeding to submit the
question of the voluntariness of a confession to the jury only
" A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
12 See, e.g., Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
53 The "constitutional fact" doctrine of Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932),
has at least once been referred to as the source of this obligation. In Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 19o n.6 (1964), Mr. Justice Brennan cited Crowell to justify
the independent judgment made by the Court on a film's social value. This is a
doubtful citation. Crowell rested on article III, not the first amendment, and as
such had no relevance to an appeal from the state courts. Moreover, Crowell was
concerned with the distribution of functions between courts and administrative
agencies, not with the distribution of functions within the judicial system itself.
Finally, on appeals from state courts, the Court has always asserted a broad
power to make an independent judgment on "law application" questions quite
apart from Crowell. E.g., Recznik v. Lorain, 393 U.S. 166 (1968) (redetermination
of factual matters affecting legality of an arrest); Davis v. North Carolina, 384
U.S. 737, 741-42 (1966) (redetermination of whether confession coerced); Watts
v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50-51 (1949) (same); see Hill, The Inadequate State
Ground, 65 CoLum. L. REV. 943, 946-48 (1965); Note, Supreme Court Review of
State Findings of Fact in Fourteenth Amendment Cases, 14 STAN. L. REv. 328
(1962). There is, however, a close relationship between the Crowell case and the
rules governing Supreme Court review of state court judgments. Both seem to
focus on the undisputed historical facts. See JAnE, supra note 13, at 645 n.6.
54341 U.S. 494 (I95i).
55 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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after he himself had made an independent judgment that the
confession was voluntary.
II. REQUIREMENT THAT THE JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
PRECEDE OR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOW GOVERNMENTAL
INTERVENTION

The other major teaching of the obscenity cases is that in the
first amendment area judicial review must either precede final
governmental action or expeditiously follow it. Both Freedman
and Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusak 11 invalidated statutes which did
not provide for immediate judicial review of the administrative
determination. In part, this result seems predicated on the belief
that delay in the availability of judicial relief differs only in
degree, and sometimes not at all, from the complete absence of
judicial review. The requirement of expeditious judicial review
is an extension of the reasoning that underlies the Thornhill
doctrine." Under Thornhill, a defendant whose conduct could
constitutionally be punished is permitted to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under which he is being prosecuted
"on its face" at least in part because of the overriding first
amendment interest in seeing that legislation which chills first
amendment rights is struck down as soon as possible.
A. Ex Parte Seizures and Restraining Orders
The Court has consistently refused to sanction any attempt
at wholesale seizure of materials or injunctive restraint of speech
prior to an adversary proceeding before a court. Two decisions
dealing with the ex parte seizure of books were of central importance in this development. In Marcus v. A Search Warrant
58
of Property,
the Court invalidated a clumsy Missouri procedure under which police officers, executing a vague, ex parte
warrant, seized approximately i,ooo copies of 280 publications.
Mr. Justice Brennan's majority opinion reasoned that the states
were not free to adopt any procedure they saw fit regarding
obscenity. The warrants in Marcus left far too broad a discretion in the arresting officer. In A Quantity of Books v.
U.S. 139 (1968).
" The doctrine is derived from Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). The
Court has explicitly recognized the relevance of Thornhill. Citing Thornhill, the
Court in Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 63 (x963), said that "Marcus
[v. A Search Warrant of Property, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), which invalidated an ex
56390
1

parte warrant procedure as inconsistent with the first amendment] ...

is ...

but a special instance of the larger principle that the freedoms of expression must
be ringed about with adequate bulwarks."
5s 367 U.S. 717 (x961).
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Kansas," the Court condemned a considerably more restricted
seizure procedure. After carefully examining seven books, all
appearing under the Night Stand label, a judge concluded that
they appeared obscene and that they were representative of all
books bearing that label. He thereupon issued a warrant for the
seizure of all copies of the seven books, and of all other Night
Stand books. A seven-to-two majority held that this procedure
was constitutionally deficient, both with respect to the named
and the unnamed books. Mr. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
sharpened Marcus by holding that seizure of books prior to an
adversary hearing on their unprotected character was an impermissible intrusion upon first amendment interests. If any "seizure
of books precedes an adversary determination of their obscenity,
there is danger of abridgment of the right of the public in a free
society to unobstructed circulation of non-obscene books." 60
Ex parte seizures of materials are closely akin to ex parte
restraints against speech, and not surprisingly the Court has
been increasingly sensitive to the necessity for a prior adversary
hearing in the latter area. This sensitivity first manifested itself
in movie censorship cases. There the Court early recognized
that motion picture exhibitors may be required to submit their
films prior to showing, and that, as incident thereto, some interim restraint is permissible. But in Freedman,6 the Court was
careful to observe that "[a]ny restraint imposed in advance
of a final judicial determination on the merits must . . .be

so378

U.S.

205

"I1d.
at 213.

(1964).
Few situations warrant exemption from the prohibition against

interim restraint or seizure prior to an adversary hearing. Perhaps the Post Office
can be authorized to exclude material from the mails and to seize allegedly obscene
materials for condemnation, but this seems doubtful, as the concurring opinion in
Manual Enterprises indicated. 370 U.S. at 497-98. The federal government's interest in the control of obscenity is marginal at best, in view of the extensive state
legislation in the area, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 503-o5 (I957). In addition, under a recently enacted
federal statute, the addressees of allegedly obscene material can request the Post
Office to discontinue delivery. 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (Supp. III, 1967), held constitutional in Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, 300 F. Supp. 1o36 (C.D.
Cal. 1969), prob. jurs. noted, 38 U.S.L.W. 315o (U.S. Oct. 27, 1969). This statute
would seem adequate to vindicate any federal interests involved.
A more solidly based exception to the prohibition against wholesale seizures
might be thought to exist in the customs area. By statute, customs officials are
authorized to impound obscene materials and to institute forfeiture proceedings.
Tariff Act of 193o § 3o5, ig U.S.C. § I3O5 (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1965).
While no court has yet held that this aspect of customs procedure is invalid, at
least one district court has upheld bulk seizures only on the assumption that the
safeguards of Freedman were applicable. United States v. 77 Cartons of Magazines,
3oo F. Supp. 851, 852-53 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
6138o U.S. at 59; accord, Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusak, 390 U.S. 139 (1968).
The Court's early references to the problem were extremely uncertain. The stat-
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limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed
period compatible with sound judicial resolution." The cases
upon which Freedman relied, particularly A Quantity of Books
v. Kansas,62 plainly suggest that the propriety of any interim
restraint should be conditioned on the availability of a prior
adversary hearing. The justification for this requirement need
not be labored. The requirement of a prior adversary hearing sharply reduces the chances of an erroneous injunction. At
such a hearing, the judge will not only receive a more accurate
description of the relevant factual considerations than is ordinarily available at-an ex parte hearing, but his attention will also
be directed to the relevant legal principles.13 In addition, the
adversary hearing will insure that any injunctive order which
issues will "be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs
of the case." 04 Moreover, with respect to exhibition of films,
ex parte orders have a drastic impact. Since the film is presumably being shown, the exhibitor is given no notice that he may
ute upheld in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (x957), did permit an
ex parte injunction, but the Court observed that the duration of that order was brief
and that it was unclear whether a violation of the order would under state law be
punished as contempt "if (the defendant) prevails on the [merits]." 354 U.S. at
443 n.2. Kingsley Books was, however, given a somewhat different reading in
subsequent decisions. There was a strong suggestion in Marcus that no punishment
for violation of an ex parte order would be sustained:
. . . Kingsley Books does not support the proposition that the State may
impose the extensive restraints imposed here on the distribution of these
publications prior to an adversary proceeding on the issue of obscenity, irrespective of whether or not the material is legally obscene. This Court
expressly noted there that the State was not attempting to punish the distributors for disobedience of any interim order entered before hearing.
376 U.S. at 735-36. And in Freedman, the Court said of Kingsley, "Etlhat procedure postpones any restraint against sale until a judicial determination of obscenity
following notice and an adversary hearing." 38o U.S. at 6o. These cases suggest
that no ex parte order can be made the basis for contempt findings in obscenity cases.
Freedman also added another significant limitation -there
must be a provision for speedy resolution of the merits. This is a salutary limitation. The
dangers to first amendment interests posed by interim injunctions are substantially
reduced when quick decisions on the merits are forthcoming. These dangers are
by no means eliminated, however, because the appeal process is necessarily time
consuming. Accordingly, an expedited appeal process is also necessary if restraint
is sought during the appeal. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S.
676, 69c n.22 (1968). It may well be that a publisher or exhibitor who wins in
the lower court should be subject to no restraint pending the appeal. Tyrone,
Inc. v. Wilkinson, 41o F.2d 639 ( 4 th Cir. 1969), suggests that result. But it is
difficult to see that this reflects any generalized principle that a free speech claimant
can never be restrained on appeal if he is successful in the trial court. In a large
scale demonstration, for example, success by the demonstrators in the lower court
should not invariably carry with it any automatic immunities pending appeal.
62 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
6

3See id. at 210-11; cf. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393

U.S. 175, 183-84 (1968).
64 Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. i75, 183 (x968).
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quickly need to obtain a substitute film. There is, therefore, a

clear.danger of a temporary interruption of the exhibitor's business. 5 This is, of course, not the case in the normal book situation since the bookseller can continue to sell other materials.
The problem of ex parte restraint became particularly acute
in two recent decisions dealing with ex parte orders against demonstrations. In the first, Walker v. City of Birmingham,66 the
defendants had been convicted of contempt for violating an ex
parte order against holding a demonstration. The state court
refused to consider a contention that the conviction was unconstitutional because the restraining order simply tracked the
language of an unconstitutionally broad ordinance. The state
court followed the nearly universal rule that in contempt proceedings the merits of an injunction issued by a court "with

jurisdiction" cannot be litigated.6 7 On appeal, a bare majority
" The decision in Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (i968), is,
therefore, mystifying. There the Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, voided a
seizure of a film because the warrant which authorized the seizure was issued on
the basis of conclusory allegations. In so doing, the Court expressly reserved the
question "whether the justice of the peace should have viewed the motion picture
before issuing the warrant." Id. at 637. It is difficult to believe that this is an open
question after Marcus, and the Court's concern about the "difficulty" of viewing
the film prior to issuance of the warrant is singularly unpersuasive. But the difficulties in Lee Art Theatre run even deeper. Marcus teaches that an adversary
proceeding is important because it can direct the judge to the relevant legal considerations. Accordingly, even if a judge had viewed the film, no seizure could
be permitted before some adversary hearing has taken place.
Lee Art Theatre has resulted in considerable confusion and divergence of
opinion among the lower courts. Thus, in a brief, wholly inadequate opinion, the
Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court has held that Lee Art Theatre permitted
pretrial seizure if the warrant was issued on the basis of precise allegations of the
film's content. Commonwealth v. State Amusement Corp., 248 N.E. 2d 497 (Mass.
1969). But in Tyrone, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 42o F.2d 639 ( 4 th Cir. 1969), where
the issuing magistrate had viewed the film, the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite
result. The court relied upon A Quantity of Books and said that "the reasons for
an adversary hearing before seizure apply as strongly to [movies] as they do to
books." Id. at 641. Accord, Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Cahn, 416 F.2d 410
(2d Cir. 1969).
08388 U.S. 307 (1967).
67 Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922). See generally Rodgers, The Elusive
Search For The Void Injunction: Res Judicata Principles in Criminal Contempt
Proceedings, 49 B.U.L. REv. 251, 270-84 (1969). One could have objected that
an injunction which was unlawful under the first amendment deprived the court
of "jurisdiction." Developments in the law of habeas corpus would support such
an argument. The Supreme Court extended habeas corpus to reach convictions
based on unconstitutionally utilized evidence through the fiction that use of the
tainted evidence deprived the trial court of "jurisdiction." See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
39X, 404-15 (1963); id. at 449-63 (dissenting opinion). But this fiction is utter
nonsense; it has been discarded in the habeas corpus area and should not be extended elsewhere. Like most fictions, it simply verbalized results reached on far
different grounds.
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of the Supreme Court upheld the contempt finding in Walker in
an opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart. The opinion was unclear on
whether the ordinance was void on its face."8 But, in any event,
the core conduct which the ex parte order prohibited was clear
enough, the Court said. Mr. Justice Stewart stressed the wide
acceptance of the rule relied upon by the state court and said
that there was no evidence that efforts by defendants to dissolve
the injunction would have met with "delay or frustration." In
these circumstances, the Court refused to permit the defendants
to ignore the judicial order: "respect for judicial process is a
small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law. .

. ."

11 The

minority in Walker thought the ordinance invalid on its face and
reasoned that its command gained no strength by being embodied
in a judicial decree. 70 Moreover, they seem to have accepted the
approach of Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown 7 1- that the first
amendment prohibits a contempt adjudication on the basis of an
ex parte order if the injunction is later defeated on the merits at best a dubious policy, since it encourages gambling with judicial orders.
Walker is hardly unambiguous. What the majority would
have thought if they had concluded that the ordinance upon which
the injunction had issued and which it had tracked was void on
its face is uncertain. This is particularly troublesome since a few
72
years later, the Court in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
a case arising out of the same demonstration, held that "as written" the ordinance was plainly void. 73 Moreover, in Walker, the
majority left open the question whether defendants could have
challenged the validity of the injunction if the Alabama 74courts
had erroneously refused to dissolve it upon their request.
In any event, in Carroll v. President and Commissioners of
Princess Anne,7 5 decided last Term, the Court indicated that,
like seizures, injunctions must follow adversary hearings, absent
an overriding emergency. The Court held that no ex parte order
is valid if an adversary hearing on the question of interim restraint is practicable, even though a procedure is available to
'8 The Court said that the ordinance "would unquestionably raise substantial
constitutional issues concerning some of its provisions," but that since a narrowed
construction was possible, "it could not be assumed that this ordinance was void
on its face." 388 U.S. at 316-17.
69
1d. at 321.
"°Id.at 328, 345-46 (Warren, C.J., dissenting; Brennan, J., dissenting).
71354 U.S. 436 (1957) ; see note 6o supra.
72394 U.S. 147 (1969).
7
1Id. at 150-53. Walker would suggest that even if the ordinance was void

"as written" it could not be disregarded at least until the state court had declined
to give the ordinance a narrowed construction.
74 388 U.S. at 318-19.
75393 U.S. 175 (1968).
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dissolve the ex parte order. The holding was not clear-cut because Carroll arose on a direct appeal from the granting of the
order and not in the context of a contempt adjudication for
violating the ex parte order. One could, of course, argue that a
contempt finding would have been void because the ex parte
order was a nullity. But the real question is somewhat different.
Should judicial orders be ignored in the hope of proving that an
adversary hearing was practicable? If not, how will the states
be compelled to comply with Carroll?
Despite the general undesirability of ex parte orders, they
should not be invariably barred by the first amendment. The
boundaries of any such rule would be unclear, particularly where
speech is mixed with conduct, as in picketing and demonstrations.
More importantly, such a rule could result in the sacrifice of
important public interests. For example, an ex parte order might
be indispensable to protect substantial public interests against a
sudden, large-scale demonstration. Carroll should be read, therefore, as authorizing the issuance of brief ex parte restraining
orders where there is a compelling justification for doing so,
where it is not reasonably possible to have a prior adversary
hearing, and where speedy methods are available to dissolve any
erroneous order.7 This is consistent with generally accepted
principles governing first amendment limitations: restrictions on
free speech are valid where necessary to vindicate compelling
governmental interests and where no less restrictive alternatives
are available.

77

Since ex parte orders can have a drastic impact on first
amendment interests, the limitations suggested above must be
satisfied. The state ought to carry the burden of proof that an
ex parte order is necessary, and unless the record affirmatively
showed that the burden had been met any contempt finding
should be invalidated.7 8 There is no justification, however, for
permitting the parties to ignore an injunction simply because it
is erroneous, whether or not they have unsuccessfully attempted
76 Carroll seems to assume this to be the case, albeit somewhat by indirection.
There is a place in our jurisprudence for ex parte issuance, without notice,
of temporary restraining orders of short duration; but there is no place
within the area of basic freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment for
such orders where no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or to
notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to participate.

393 U.S. at i8o.
"See Sheldon v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (i96o). But see Note, Less Drastic
Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969).
7s Even outside the first amendment context, the Court has shown a rapidly accelerating tendency to require that the record show affirmatively the justification for the state's conduct. Gaps in the record on appeal no longer will be used
to support the conviction. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969), and
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969), both decided at the end of the
last Term, are two illustrations of this significant development.
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to seek its dissolution.70 The first amendment cannot sensibly be
read to require the impossible; some margin for good faith error
is acceptable so long as reasonably adequate procedures are avail80
able to evaluate first amendment claims.
The discussion of the permissibility of seizure of arguably
protected materials invites consideration of a still more difficult
problem- whether the first amendment imposes any restrictions
upon the power of the police to arrest those colorably exercising
first amendment rights. So far at least, only the fourth amendment has restricted police conduct, and the only constitutional
remedy for a violation of its command is the suppression of any
illegally obtained evidence. 8 ' And the fourth amendment is generally taken to permit the arrest of those committing offenses in
the presence of the arresting officer.8 2 The California Supreme
Court has ruled that under the first amendment a film cannot be
seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; 83 but what of the arrest
of the film exhibitor himself? 84 Arrests of exhibitors, distributors, or protestors can dampen enthusiasm for the exercise of first
amendment rights. What justification is there, for example, for
permitting the arrest of a clerk in a paperback store or in a drug
store for selling Candy or The Strap Returns? Functionally, an
arrest resembles a non-judicially imposed injunction against certain conduct; and where timing is important, as in many demonstrations, an arrest, like an ex parte injunction, can wholly
frustrate the exercise of first amendment rights without any
searching inquiry into the merits of the first amendment claim.
Indeed, here there is not even the barest judicial inquiry before
the damage is done. Finally, the whole process of arrest and pretrial confinement may well discourage many from future activities
that might approach the borderline.
79 One commentator seems to assert that although a state contempt conviction
entered under such circumstances would be affirmed on direct appeal, it could be
set aside on federal habeas corpus. Rodgers, supra note 67, at 264-65. This seems
far wide of the mark. The petitioners would be in custody for violating the injunction, and that order is valid and binding whether erroneous or not. Moreover,
if it is not binding, there is no reason for not so declaring on direct appeal.
"0In the context under discussion, the first amendment would at least require
some expedited appeal procedure. If the procedure is available, the injunction
cannot be violated because in a particular case time was too short to take advantage
of even an expedited appellate procedure. See note 6x supra.
" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (i6s).
"'See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
8 Flack v. Municipal Court, 66 Cal. 2d 981, 429 P.2d 192, 59 Cal. Rptr. 872
(C967). But cf. Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 3o1 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
84 See Pinkus v. Arnebergh, 258 F. Supp. 996, oo3 (C.D. Cal. 2966) (arrest
of exhibitor does not violate first amendment) ; cf. Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 301
F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. I969).
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Though the argument has been rejected by one district judge
as "ludicrous," 8 5 the foregoing considerations make it inviting to
view the first amendment as a source of restrictions upon the
power of the police to seize persons as well as things. But the
problems with this approach are considerable. The difficulties
are not primarily remedial: an exclusionary rule could be developed, and suits under the civil rights act permitted. 86 The
problems are in fashioning criteria which can be applied by those
charged with enforcing the law. Some limits do suggest themselves, however. The first amendment can be read as ordinarily
barring any attempted arrests of addressees of speech. For example, a federal judge in San Francisco has recently enjoined
city officials from arresting patrons at movie theaters prior to a
determination that the film being viewed is obscene, 87 where the
arrests were made as part of a stepped-up drive on the exhibition
of allegedly obscene films and with the express purpose of discouraging attendance. On the other hand, it is far more difficult
to frame rules grounded on the first amendment which could be
applied to arrests of speakers. The range of factual situations
(e.g., demonstrations, leafletting, movie exhibitions) does not
readily yield to generalizations. One might, however, consider
whether the first amendment should require the use of summonses rather than arrests except where there is a clear and
convincing showing that the arresting officer could not have expected the arrested person to respond to a summons. This rule
would clearly prevent arrests of those movie exhibitors and retail
book sellers who have roots in the community.
B. Permits
Although publication or distribution of a book cannot be conditioned on issuance of a permit or license, 8 most other first
amendment activity - demonstrations, parades, public exhibition
of a film 19m can. Licensing, which functionally has the impact
" Rage Books, Inc. v. Leary, 3o F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
so42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). The availability of damages under this section in
cases not involving violence or other shocking conduct has not been explicitly
established. Compare Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (ig6i), with Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
87 Demmich & Co. v. Alioto, No. 51994 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1969) (Zirpoli, J.).
Contra, Barrows v. Reddin, 3or F. Supp. 574 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (injunction against

continuous arrest of performers refused). See also Bee See Books, Inc. v. Leary,
291 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (injunction against presence of a police officer in
a book store).
"See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
8See Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusak, 390 U.S. 139, 141 (1968); Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965). Constitutional guarantees require that a
licensing system contain "procedural safeguards" to protect against the dangers of

censorship.
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of a specially tailored injunction with respect to the exercise of
a first amendment right, has felt the impact of the principles
announced in Freedman. The outstanding example of this impact is shown by Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, ° decided
last Term.
In Shuttlesworth, the defendant was convicted for engaging
in a march in violation of a local ordinance which required a
permit. The ordinance authorized the denial of the permit if the
local authorities concluded that "the public welfare, peace, safety,
health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that
it be refused." 91 Prior to the march city authorities had made
it clear to defendant that under no circumstances would a permit
be issued. On appeal, the conviction was reversed by the Supreme
Court. The Court began by observing that peaceful demonstrations were unquestionably a form of expression. The Court, however, recognized that the municipality may "rightfully exercise a
great deal of control in the interest of traffic regulation and public
safety," 02 and accordingly, permit ordinances narrowly directed
to those ends could not be held invalid on their face. But "as
written," this permit ordinance was not so confined; rather, it
amounted to a grant of "extensive authority to issue or refuse to
issue parade permits on the basis of broad criteria entirely unrelated to legitimate municipal regulation of the public streets and
sidewalks." 3 This is impermissible. Under the first amendment,
a municipality may not empower its licensing officials to roam
essentially at will, dispensing or withholding permission to speak,
assemble, picket, or parade, according to their own opinions regarding the potential effect of the activity in question
on the
'welfare,' 'decency,' or 'morals' of the community. 94
The fact that the defendant had not applied for a license was
irrelevant. Citing an almost unbroken line of decisions extending
back to Lovell v. City of Grifin,95 the Court held that a person
faced with an unconstitutional licensing ordinance regulating free
expression may ignore it with impunity and that in a criminal
prosecution for violating such an ordinance, the defendant can
raise the invalidity of the ordinance on its face.
So viewed, Shuttlesworth was solidly grounded on precedent.
But the state sought to affirm the judgment by reliance on Cox
g0394 U.S. 147 (1969).
91
92 Id.

at 149.
d. at 152.
d. at 153.

93

95

at

303 U.S. 444 (1938).

151

n.3.

The cases are collected in the Court's opinion, 394 U.S.
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v. New Hampshire 0 Cox involved a conviction for failure to
obtain a permit under a broadly written permit statute which was
completely silent on the criteria governing the issuance of permits; the state court had sustained the conviction, after giving
the statute a narrow construction. The Supreme Court affirmed.
In Shuttlesworth, the highest state court did precisely the same
thing; it sought to narrow the ordinance's broad language to constitutionally permissible limits, and on that basis it sustained the
conviction. Assuming that the ordinance was valid as construed,
the Court proceeded to limit Cox. The Court considered Cox
inapplicable where no one could have anticipated the narrowed
construction and where the record showed that the local authorities had in fact operated under the free-wheeling permission
apparently conferred upon them. 7
Shuttlesworth did not explicitly delineate the relevance of
Freedman to the permit granting process, but seemed to assume
that, in general, Freedman would apply. The Court remarked in
a footnote that whether the state court's interpretation had rendered the statute constitutional "would depend upon, among other
things, the availability of expeditious judicial review of the Commission's refusal of a permit." " The Court then referred to
Freedman and to the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan
9 9
which was cast entirely in terms of Freedman.
Mr. Justice
Harlan found the ordinance invalid for lack of expeditious administrative and judicial procedures for review of permit denials.
He considered Freedman's requirement of speed particularly important here. Some delay may be tolerated in the movie cases
because, the exhibitor's interests aside, the public will ultimately
see the film. "In contrast, timing is of the essence in politics. It
is almost impossible to predict the political future; and when an
event occurs, it is often necessary to have one's voice heard
promptly, if it is to be considered at all." 10
All the reasons which justify the result in Freedman apply
in the permit cases. And if the principles announced in the former
case are applied to statutes and ordinances governing the issuance of permits for parades and demonstrations, virtually all will
be held unconstitutional on their face - unless the state courts
virtually rewrite them "to avoid constitutional doubt." Few, if
any, of those statutes or ordinances contain any timetable whatever, or impose the burden of seeking judicial review upon the
public authorities.
9312 U.S. 569 (1941).
97394 U.S. at 155-59.
98

Id. at 155 n.4.

09
1d.
0

at x59-64.
1 1id. at 163.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83:518

Freedman clearly should govern the permit cases, but the
increased administrative burdens on the state are significant. The
exhibitor can plan his operations so that questionable films will
have sufficient time to clear the administrative-judicial procedure
prescribed by Freedman. But there may be far less "lead time"
in the case of demonstrations and protests. Some are planned
well in advance; others are generated by rapidly developing
events. The premises implicit in a permit statute require recognition of the fact that the government may legitimately require
some brief notice - for administrative processing and police protection - but the period must be of very short duration. 10 1
One final matter might be mentioned. The Court's concern
for adequate procedures in permit cases requires that Poulos v.
New Hampshire 102 be discarded. There the defendant had applied for a permit to conduct religious services under a statute
which was silent as to the criteria governing permit issuance.
The permit was refused, but the services were held without a
permit. After a determination by the state supreme court that
the statute involved was constitutional when narrowly construed,
the defendant was convicted for violation of the permit statute.
The trial court held that the refusal of the city authorities to
issue the permit was unreasonable, but refused to dismiss the
case because the applicants should have sought relief in civil
proceedings rather than deliberately violating the ordinance. The
state supreme court said that since the ordinance was valid on
its face the defendants' remedy was to apply for a writ of certiorari, not to violate the ordinance and then attempt to set up the
defense of the arbitrary refusal of the license in a subsequent
prosecution. The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting claims that
to foreclose a criminal defendant from raising the unlawfulness
of the administrative action violated due process and/or the first
amendment. Mr. Justice Reed's opinion distinguished the line of
cases which eventually led to Shuttlesworth on the ground that
there the statutes or ordinances were invalid on their face whereas
in Poulos the only claim was wrongful conduct under a valid
statute. 10 3 In a concurring opinion Justice Frankfurter relied on
the absence of any showing that the defendant could not obtain
prompt judicial review of the denial of the permit, and on the
ample opportunity which he had to seek review since the permit
101

See the discussion in A Quaker Action Group v. Hickel, 38 U.S.L.W. 2015

(D.C. Cir. June 24, 1969) (Bazelon, C.J.), in which the court upheld a fifteen-day
notice provision for demonstrations across the street from the White House. But it
is doubtful that such a lengthy notice will be tolerated generally.
102 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
'03 Id. at 414.
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was denied seven weeks prior to the date of the scheduled service.° 4
Poulos is plainly inadequate on first amendment grounds. It
rests upon a distinction between statutes unconstitutional on
their face and those unconstitutionally applied in particular cases.
But the latter situation presents considerable danger to first
amendment interests because the low visibility of the administrative decision permits easy destruction of first amendment interests. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion meets this problem
part way, by its stress on the necessity for "adequate" judicial
review of the permit denial. But Freedman would require much
more: (a) that the licensing statute itself contain specific time
limits for administrative and judicial action, and (b) that the
burden of instituting judicial review rest with the state or municipality.
C. The Constitutional Preference for Criminal
Proceedings and Anticipatory Relief
The Court has indicated a marked preference for the ordinary
criminal prosecution as a judicial vehicle for determination of
obscenity. 10 5 Several reasons for this preference are evident. The
rigorous procedural safeguards. which inhere in the criminal trial
will "focus searchingly" on the first amendment claim. And in
principle, at least, a criminal defendant is free to distribute the
challenged materials during the period in which he is contesting
the prosecution. (His willingness to do so will, of course, vary
with a number of factors, including his judgment as to his chances
of success and his fear of prosecution for interim distribution.)
Additional and more subtle considerations also support the Court's
preference. Use of the criminal process means that the burden
of going forward rests with the government, and the force of
inertia alone will discourage some prosecutions. Moreover, the
action must be brought by a public prosecutor, who cannot be
single-minded, as can an administrative agency, about the prosecution of first amendment cases; he has limited resources with
which to enforce all the laws of the community, and concentration
on one area will mean sacrificing enforcement in another.
A criminal prosecution may be an appropriate vehicle for
protecting first amendment interests where the protected character of the speech involved can only be determined after the
fact. However, where the speech is fixed (as in a movie) and
its protected character can be determined prior to distribution
104 Id. at 420. This interpretation of Poulos received the approval of the Court

in Shuttlesworth. 394 U.S. at i55 n.4.
105 See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 69-70 (1963).
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and sale, an in rem procedure similar to that of Massachusetts
may be superior. Massachusetts permits the Commonwealth to
bring an in rem proceeding against any book to determine its
status."' 0 Since the book distributor can appear to defend the
book, 0 7 this procedure permits him to obtain a penalty-free determination of the protected character of the book.'
Even if
there is no constitutional obligation on the states to proceed by
a penalty-free determination, where first amendment interests are
at stake this Massachusetts in rem procedure is plainly desirable
as a matter of policy.
While the Massachusetts procedure (or a declaratory judgment) is adequate, so far as the first amendment is concerned,
for determining that the first amendment protects the material,
more serious problems arise when the state uses in a criminal
prosecution prior in rem determinations that the first amendment
does not protect certain material. The Massachusetts law, for
example, expressly provides that in any criminal prosecution for
a sale after an in rem determination of obscenity a defendant
shall be "conclusively presumed" to have knowledge that the
book is obscene. 10 The presumption seems to have so little basis
200

MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 272, §§ 28C-28H (igg9).

The statute is set

out as an appendix to the opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan in A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413,
421-24 (1966).
107 Section 28D provides that "Any person interested in the sale, loan or distribution of said book may appear and file an answer .... "
10' Indeed, I was formerly of the opinion that a case could be made that the
first amendment required the state to proceed in a manner which sought prospective
relief only (for example, by way of declaratory or injunctive proceedings, or in rem
against the book), at least if obscenity embraced anything other than "I-know-itwhen-I-see-it" hard core pornography. I thought this procedure required because
of the vagueness which inheres in the concept of obscenity and the obvious advantage of a penalty-free determination in not exposing the publisher or distributor
to crushing criminal penalties. That position seems foreclosed by Mishkin v.
New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). See Monaghan, Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage
of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod, 76 YALE L.J. 127, X55 (1966)
(hereinafter cited as Monaghan). And further reflection convinces me that, as
a general principle, my original view is open to serious objection. It failed to
distinguish between situations where the dimension of the free speech claim is
readily apparent before any sanction (e.g., movies) and those where it might not be
(e.g., demonstrations, the legality of all aspects of which may not be specified in
advance). It is, moreover, difficult to see what the boundaries of the proposed
rule would be. Would it mean, for example, that a state could not litigate the lawfulness of an arguably legal entry on property-such as the distribution of
leaflets at a shopping center -in
the form of a criminal prosecution, but only by
civil suit. If so, there would be a considerable shift in the present practice, because, unless an injunction were obtained, the distribution could continue undeterred by disruptive arrests.
' 0 MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 28H (1959).
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in reason as to be unconstitutional. 10° In addition, this procedure
would seem to violate due process, at least if any substantial
penalty were to be imposed,"' since the statute seems to foreclose the defendant's raising his lack of knowledge of the contents of the book or of the prior proceeding." 2 Even if the retailer
knew of the prior proceeding, it is questionable whether, as a
constitutional matter, he can be bound by the results."3 To be
sure, the state can make a plausible case for the position that
the prior determination should be binding against those specifically put on notice. While no retailer is likely to participate in
the original proceeding, the publisher can and does appear in
behalf of the book. Given the considerable identity of interest
between the publisher and local retailers, the state might argue
that it can fairly decline to litigate the protected character of
the book more than once. Nonetheless, to permit the state to
foreclose in a subsequent criminal proceeding against a retailer
the defense that the book is constitutionally protected would
raise serious constitutional problems.
110 See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969)

(striking down as unconstitu-

tional a statutory presumption from possession of marijuana that possessor knew
it had been imported), noted in The Supreme Court, z968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV.
7, 1O3 (1969).
.. However, in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-36 (1968), Mr. Justice
Marshall's opinion apparently assumes that the states have unlimited power to dispense with any requirement of inens rea in criminal prosecutions. See Hart, The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 433 (1958). But it is
difficult to believe that a lengthy jail sentence could constitutionally be imposed
in the absence of some showing of culpable misconduct. For an excellent discussion
of the mens rea requirement, see Comment, Counseling Draft Resistance: The Case
for a Good Faith Belief Defense, 78 YALE LJ. ioo8, 1022-27 (1969), particularly
at 1023 n.75, which however does not discuss Powell. See also Greenawalt, "Uncontrollable" Actions and the Eighth Amendment: Implications of Powell v. Texas,
69 CoLum. L. REV. 927, 963 (1969).
"'See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. i47 (I959)

(first amendment invalidates
ordinance imposing strict liability on retail seller of obscene materials because it
would discourage sellers from selling any potentially controversial books).
112 To be sure, in the extraordinary case of Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414 (1944), the Court sustained a wartime measure which precluded a criminal
defendant from challenging the correctness of a general administrative regulation
fixing maximum prices for the sale of beef. But even permissively read, Yakus
provides no support for extension of in rem and class action principles into the
area of criminal prosecutions. In Yakus the defendant was not simply under a
general mandate to act lawfully; he had notice of a specific duty imposed upon
him (and others similarly situated) by an administrative price-fixing regulation.
By contrast, the Massachusetts book seller is required at a minimum to assess the
overall significance of the in rem action-even though at the time of the proceeding he might not be selling any of the books at issue. The immediacy of the
impact of the in rem proceeding on the seller is, therefore, not nearly so sharp
or defined as the rate regulation in Yakus. Moreover, in Yakus a specific statutory
proceeding was provided to challenge the administrative command, and the Court
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Quite apart from these considerations, however, the first
amendment itself may bar in rem or class actions when free
speech interests hang in the balance. Noto v. United States 114
suggests such a limitation. Noto was a Smith Act prosecution
in which the Government had to prove certain characteristics of
the Communist Party. These characteristics had been established
in criminal prosecutions against other defendants."' In finding
the Government's evidence insufficient, the Court laconically remarked:

116

It need hardly be said that it is upon the particular evidence in
a particular record that a particular defendant must be judged,
and not upon the evidence in some other record or upon what
may be supposed to be the tenets of the Communist Party.
Moreover, both Smith v. California117 and Speiser v. Randall 118 would seem to bar not only a conclusive presumption but
also any use of the in rem judgment as prima facie evidence of
scienter. In Smith the Court struck down a statute which imposed strict liability on a bookseller since such a doctrine would
necessarily cause a seller to steer wide of the danger zone. Speiser
involved a statute which placed the burden of proof that speech
was protected on the free speech claimant. The Court held that
since there is always a chance of error in the factfinding process,
the burden of proof should operate to decide close cases in favor
of the speech's being found protected. Speiser rested on the recognition that a taxpayer, knowing that he will have to sustain
the virtually impossible burden of proof that he had not engaged in forbidden activities, would avoid any vaguely suspicious
activity.
refused to read the statute as foreclosing a defense that the administrative order
was unconstitutional on its face, see 321 U.S. at 446-47, which would suggest that
a defendant could not be precluded from arguing that the "social value" of the
materials in question was "clear" and "self-demonstrating".
Yakus, however, may not represent the broadest latitude given to Congress
to foreclose defenses in criminal trials. Two Selective Service cases, Falbo v. United
States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944), and Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (2946),
recognize only the narrowest review over an administrative order. This is, however, not an occasion to consider these cases further. They have been subject to
harsh criticism by Professor Hart. Hart, supra note 13, at i38o-83. See also
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953),

discussed at pp. 542-43 supra,

where the state court refused to permit a criminal defendant to raise the validity
of an administrative order specifically directed to him. The state court held that the
order could be attacked only by certiorari order. The Supreme Court affirmed,
rejecting contentions that this procedure violated due process and/or the first
amendment.
114367

U.S.

290

(ig6i).

.. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
116367 U.S. at 299.
117363 U.S. 147 (X959).
118357 U.S. 5,3 (i958).

203

(i96i).
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Even if the first amendment does not require the state to

proceed by way of a penalty-free proceeding, however, it might
require that the state permit a distributor to initiate a penaltyfree proceeding to determine the constitutional status of a book
or motion picture or activity. More broadly stated, this means
that some prospective remedy such as an injunction or declaratory judgment must be made available at the option of a pros-

pective defendant. Freedom from criminal penalty is not all that
is at stake here. If prospective relief is available, a distributor
can avoid incurring the substantial costs of production, advertising, or distribution of material that eventually proves to be unprotected. The possibility of such wasted expenditures may well
deter the cautious businessman from handling material that is at
all questionable.
There is, of course, considerable support for the view that
both Congress and the states possess wide discretion in shaping
their own remedial systems." 9 And, as Professor Hart observes,
our historical tradition is that "preventive relief is the exception
rather than the rule. That naturally makes it hard to hold that
anybody has a constitutional right to an injunction or a declaratory judgment." 120 It may therefore be argued that the Constitution is satisfied when the defendant can raise his constitutional
right as a defense to an enforcement proceeding.' 2' But this
position seems inadequate as a matter of principle, and, while the
authorities are uncertain and not decisive here, they support the
view that in some instances the Constitution can be read to require the existence of an affirmative remedy. 22 One need not go
119 See, e.g., Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968)

(upholding constitutionality

of draft law provision barring preinduction review of draft classification); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (i943).
120 Hart, supra note 13, at 1366.
121 See generally id. at 1371-83.
122 In utility cases the due process clause has been read to require the existence
of an affirmative remedy to forestall heavy criminal penalties. E.g., Oklahoma
Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1920). See also Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 437-38 (944); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S.
196, 204-05 (1924). As Professor Freund observed, this result has been reached
"where a public utility has no means of challenging an order other than violation
and exposure to multiple penalties." P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ITS BUSINESS, PURPOSES AND POLITICS 65 (i961) [hereafter cited as
FREUND]; see note 113 supra. The analogy to the public utility cases is not perfect
of course; the utilities cannot discontinue services and the utility cases disclose
penalty schemes in fact designed to deter any challenge to the underlying orders.
But neither are these cases wholly inapposite. Surely the fact that the utility cannot
discontinue service is not controlling. To permit any person to engage in a generally lawful business or activity but to punish him criminally if he incorrectly
estimates the lawfulness of particular conduct while simultaneously depriving him
of a penalty-free determination of that conduct is dubious policy at best. See
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so far as a recent opinion in the Second Circuit which suggested
that the Constitution generally guarantees a right to equitable
relief to restrain unconstitutional action. 2 3 Nor need one accept
the recently expressed suggestion of a district judge that where
the first amendment is involved, due process and article III (but,
strangely, not the first amendment itself) are violated by a failure
to provide prospective relief. 124 The first amendment would seem
a proper source for the implication of affirmative remedies; since
the risks of the criminal process and a possibly hostile jury may
deter the exercise of first amendment freedoms as much as may
an overbroad statute, the state should be required to provide
remedies which are adequate to rectify the situation.
Professor Freund, for example, believes that the existence of
an affirmative remedy for a distributor should embrace the right
to enjoin any criminal prosecutions for interim sales, since each
interim sale would, of course, be a potential separate criminal
offense. 2 5 In effect, the Constitution requires not only a prospective remedy but such coercive relief as is necessary to ensure
protection of the first amendment right. This argument seems
sound. The critical point is that the first amendment must guarantee not simply some prospective relief, but relief fully adequate
to protect first amendment interests. The availability of relief
with respect to interim sales, moreover, should not depend upon
Note, Declaratory Relief in the Criminal Law, 8o HARV. L. REV. 1490, X493-98
(1967). This is particularly true in the area of constitutionally protected freedoms.
In addition, in the area of freedom of speech the procedures associated with the
penalty (e.g., arrest, pretrial detention, etc.) often discourage challenge to the
underlying statute or ordinance far more than the penalty it contains. In any
event, the cases dealing with the states' obligations to provide affirmative remedies
have not been confined to public utilities. Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17
(1920), and its progeny suggest that, in as yet a largely undefined set of circumstances, state courts must provide affirmative remedies to vindicate constitutional
rights. Here, however, the affirmative remedy was to recover property illegally
seized. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 n.5 (1965), also suggests that an affirmative remedy may be required to attack collaterally a conviction. But here too the
affirmative remedy will simply restore the status quo ante. General Oil Co. v.
Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 225-26 (29o8), is more helpful because it strongly intimated
that an affirmative remedy may be required where necessary to restrain threatened
illegal interferences. But Crain may have been overruled sub silentio in Georgia
RR. & Banking Co. v. Musgrove, 335 U.S. 900 (1949). Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239
U.S. 33 (i915).
See generally H.M. HART & H. WECHS.ER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND TuE FEDERAL SYSTEM 395-99, 474-77 (I953); Hill, Constitutional Remedies,
69 CoLum. L. REv. uog (x969).
123 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
409 F.2d 78, 723 (2d Cir. 1969) ("It is now clear that there is an implied injunctive remedy for threatened or continuing constitutional violations"). But the cases
relied upon by the court do not support such a broad proposition.
.24 Murray v. Vaughn, 3oo F. Supp. 688, 695 (D.R.I. 2969).
"2I See FREUND, supra note 122, at 65; cf. Karalexis v. Byrne, Civ. No. 69-665-J
(1st Cir. Nov. 28, I969) (granting temporary injunction against interim prosecutions for exhibiting allegedly obscene movie).
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a substantial allegation that the prosecutor in fact intends multiple prosecutions. A distributor should not be at the mercy of
the prosecutor and the changing pressures which influence prosecutorial discretion.
If a right to affirmative relief were recognized, it would have
implications beyond the obscenity area. Since even temporary
suspension from school can have adverse effects on a student's
education, on a nonfrivolous claim by a state university student
that he was suspended for exercising his first amendment rights
courts should be willing to issue injunctions against the university
forbidding the suspension pending a judicial determination of the
first amendment issues. Similar injunctions should be available
for state employees who are suspended for the exercise of their
first amendment rights. The procedures of legislative investigations may also be circumscribed by the first amendment. A witness at such an investigation may reveal the protected membership list of an organization rather than gamble on a finding in a
later criminal prosecution that the list was in fact protected. To
avoid this dilemma, perhaps the Constitution requires a procedure such as New Hampshire followed in Sweezy v. New Hampshire; 2 there a witness refusing to answer a question was called
before a court and, on a finding that the question was pertinent
and not protected by the Constitution, was ordered to answer.
The ensuing case arose out of a contempt of the court, not of the
legislative body itself.
Recognition that the first amendment guarantees a right to
prospective relief may have important remedial consequences
in the federal court system. The federal courts are "the primary
and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the
Constitution ...
127 Institutionally, the federal courts are
particularly sensitive to first amendment claims and are wellsuited to vindicate those claims. This suggests that where first
amendment rights are at stake, these judicially fashioned ordinances of self-denial have no place. Therefore the Court should
completely eliminate the abstention doctrine when first amendment interests are involved,'1 2 as well as the already much relaxed rule of Douglas v. City of Jeannette 129 prohibiting federal
injunctions against threatened criminal prosecutions.
126354

U.S. 234, 244 (1957).

Cf. Stamler v. Willis, 415 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir.

x969) (permitting declaratory judgment as to rule establishing House Un-American
Activities Committee).
127 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967).
128Dombrowski v. Pfister, 38o U.S. 479 (1965), and Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241 (1967), make substantial inroads on the abstention doctrine in the first
amendment context. See Karalexis v. Byrne, Civ. No. 6 9 -665-J (ist Cir. Nov. 28,
1969); Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62, 65 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
129 319 U.S. 157 (2943).
Suits against threatened criminal prosecutions are
becoming increasingly common. E.g., Karalexis v. Byrne, Civ. No. 69-665-J (xst
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The logic of the view that the first amendment has important
remedial consequences for the federal courts also necessarily calls
into question the validity of congressionally imposed jurisdictional limitations in the first amendment area. In particular, the
$io,ooo jurisdictional amount limitation governing federal question jurisdiction 130 and the statutory bar to preinduction review
of draft classifications contained in section io(b) (3) 31 of the
Military Selective Service Act may be invalid in a first amendment
context. On its face section io(b) (3) would bar prospective relief
even where first amendment interests are at stake. Suits against
state officials 132 and some actions against federal officials "I may
presently be maintained in the federal courts on first amendment
grounds without regard to any jurisdictional amount. But apparently some suits in federal court against federal officials must
still meet the $io,ooo amount of

28

U.S.C. § I33I.1 '

It is no

answer to suggest that these suits could be maintained in the
state courts, because these courts have no power to issue coercive
orders against federal officials.' 35 Whether this limitation inheres
in the basic constitutional structure, or as seems more likely,
stems from a judicially fashioned (and congressionally reversible)
common law of federalism, 3 6 the result is the same: no action
Cir. Nov. 28, I969); Barrows v. Reddin, 3o F. Supp. 574 (C.D. Cal. 1968). Even
where an injunction might not be available, declaratory relief can be utilized.
See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252-54 (x967). See generally Note, Declaratory Relief in the Criminal Law, 8o HARv. L. REV. 1490 (1967).
120 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (I964).
1 50 U.S.C. app. § 46o(b) (3) (Supp. IV, 1969). That statute purports to bar
preinduction review of "the classification or processing of any registrant by local
[draft] boards." Neither Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. ii,
393 U.S. 233 (1968), nor Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (i968), considered this

door-closing statute in a first amendment context, nor did the Court's recent per
curiam order in Boyd v. Clark, 393 U.S. 316 (1969). Lower federal courts have,
however, expressed grave reservations about the constitutionality of applying the
statute where first amendment interests are at stake. See National Students Ass'n
v. Hershey, 412 F.2d IIO3, IIO8-og (D.C. Cir. 1969); Murray v. Vaughn, 300
F. Supp.
688 (D.R.I. 1969).
12
See 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
1 One should not overlook the impact of 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1964), which
grants jurisdiction to the district courts "in the nature of mandamus to compel
an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform
a duty owed to the plaintiff." A broad reading of this grant of jurisdiction would
go far toward eliminating the problem being considered. See Murray v. Vaughn,
300 F. Supp 688, 696-97 (D.R.I. 3969). See generally Byse & Fiocca, Section
r361 of The Mandamus and Venue Act of z962 and "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARv. L. REV. 308 (3967).
34 Wolff v. Selective Service Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 3967);
Ackerman v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 3oi F. Supp. 628, 633-34 (S.D.N.Y.
I969).
135 See United States v. Tarble, 8o U.S. (33 Wall.) 397 (872).
1
36 See H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND TH3E FEDERAL
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can be maintained in the state courts. Accordingly, so long as

prospective relief is unavailable in the state courts and the federal courts have general federal question jurisdiction and the

power to award affirmative relief, the $io,ooo monetary limitation and section io(b) (3) should be disregarded where necessary
adequately to vindicate first amendment interests. 13 7 While the
1 38
Supreme Court has never invalidated a jurisdictional limitation,

surely a statute which specifically eliminated first amendment
cases from the district courts' general power to give prospective
relief would be invalid. To be sure, neither the jurisdictional

amount nor the bar against preinduction review discriminate
against first amendment claims, but they place a heavy burden

on first amendment interests "' without a showing that other
alternatives are not satisfactory to accomplish any overriding

policies advanced by these statutes.
In short, the Court should approach the problems of an-

ticipatory relief and of jurisdictional limitations with the same
sensitivity for first amendment interests shown by opinions like
Freedman. The first amendment due process cases have shown
that first amendment rights are fragile and can be destroyed by

insensitive procedures; in order to completely fulfill the promise
of those cases, courts must thoroughly evaluate every aspect of

the procedural system which protects those rights.
SYsTrEM 388 (1953).

See generally Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin
Federal Officers, 73 YALE L.J. 1385 (1964).
1"7 Cf. Hart, supra note 13, at 1386-9o. The district judge in Murray v. Vaughn,
300 F. Supp. 688, 694-95 (D.R.I. i969), seemed inclined towards this result. It is

important to stress that this argument presupposes the existence of the general
federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts. It is far beyond the scope of
this article to discuss the consequences of a serious effort by Congress to curb the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts-a subject probed with great incisiveness
by Professor Hart.
138 United States v. Klein, 8o U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), is not inconsistent with
this statement. The Court did not view the statute there involved as in fact a
jurisdictional one, but one in which Congress purportedly laid down an improper
substantive rule in the guise of a jurisdictional statute.
"0 The statutory bar contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) against enjoining
pending state criminal prosecutions is less susceptible of condemnation; compelling
considerations of federalism are present. But, nonetheless, in appropriate circumstances first amendment considerations may require the issuance of an injunction.
See Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283, 287-89 (5th Cir. 1969) (§ 2283 has limited
applicability in the first amendment area); Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 300
F. Supp. 281, 284-88 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (distributor enjoined pending state action
against retailer). In any event, declaratory relief may be appropriate. See note 229
supra. Note also should be made of the apparently growing practice of in effect
enjoining a pending suit by framing the federal complaint in terms of an action
against future prosecutions of the same character. E.g., Stein v. Batchelor, 300
F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969).

